This paper studies the e¤ect of product ownership and quality on nonstop entry in the airline industry.
From breakfast cereals to computers to airline ‡ights there are many di¤erentiated product industries in which …rms o¤er multiple products in the same market. However, there are relatively few empirical papers that examine the entry decision of multiproduct …rms. This paper studies the e¤ect of product ownership and quality on the decision to enter a market in the airline industry. The market considered in this paper is transportation services between two cities. I consider two types of services in the city pair market: nonstop service and one-stop service that stops in a hub before reaching the destination city. This paper empirically examines the decision of an airline to o¤er high quality nonstop service between cities given that the airline may be o¤ering lower quality one-stop service in that market.
In this paper I consider nonstop and one-stop ‡ights to be vertically di¤erentiated services. The nonstop service is a higher quality than the one-stop service in terms of travel time. Several demand studies show that consumers prefer more direct ‡ights. 2 One-stop services also vary in quality. I proxy for the relative quality of the one-stop service using a measure of the directness of the one-stop ‡ight.
I will use a simple example and the diagram below to illustrate the type of strategic situation analyzed in this paper. Suppose we have just two airlines, X and Y . Suppose that airline X is a hub carrier that has a hub at A and o¤ers one-stop service in the B to C market through the hub. Airline Y does not have a hub and does not have any existing service in the market. The entry game considered in this paper is the decision of airline X and airline Y to enter the B to C market with nonstop service. I view the one-stop service as a¤ecting nonstop entry through both cannibalization and business stealing e¤ects. The business stealing e¤ect is the e¤ect that competing rival one-stop service has on the pro…ts of the entering nonstop service. On the other hand, for airlines that own one-stop services, o¤ering nonstop service cannibalizes demand for their existing one-stop service. Relative to airlines that have no services in the market, airlines that o¤er one-stop service have lower incremental pro…ts from o¤ering nonstop service. In the above example, airline Y considers the business stealing e¤ect from competing with the one-stop service in the market. Airline X considers cannibalization of its own one-stop service that acts as a disincentive for entering the market. One might expect that both cannibalization and business stealing e¤ects increase as the quality of the one-stop service in the market increases. The model in this paper also considers competition between nonstop services. One might expect pro…ts to decrease when rival airlines enter the market with competing nonstop services. Finally, if airlineY enters the market, this may reduce pro…ts on airline X's one-stop service. If the pro…tability of the one-stop service is reduced then this also reduces the cannibalization e¤ect for airline X, which may increase the likelihood that it enters with nonstop service. This paper models nonstop entry of airlines as a noncooperative entry game, which allows for an economic interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients. The basic empirical approach of this paper is similar to Berry (1992) and uses a simulation estimator to recover the reduced-form incremental pro…t from o¤ering nonstop service. The model di¤ers from previous work in airline entry in two important ways. First, I focus on the nonstop entry decision while most other research aggregates across one-stop and nonstop entry. This may be important since Reiss and Spiller (1989) …nd that the type of services in airline markets (i.e. number of …rms o¤ering direct ‡ights or indirect ‡ights) is an important determinant of the level of competition in the market, not just the number of airlines in the market. They argue that aggregating across service segments may lead to incorrect inference about the pro…tability from entering a market. A second important di¤erence from previous empirical work is that I allow the ownership of one-stop service through a hub to a¤ect the incremental pro…tability of nonstop entry.
Examining the multiproduct entry decision in airline markets became more relevant as many major network carriers began operating low-cost divisions in the 1990s. 3 The low-cost divisions of major carriers operating during the period of my sample include Metrojet (US Airways), Delta Express, Continental Express and United Shuttle.
The low-cost divisions were started in an attempt by major carriers to cut costs and compete with Southwest and other low-cost carriers. This strategy has been called the "airline-wihin-an-airline" strategy because the operations of the low-cost divisions di¤er from those of the rest of the airline. The low-cost divisions cut back on passenger amenities and shifted emphasis from hub-and-spoke to point-to-point route strategies. In many cases this involved carriers expanding nonstop service to markets outside of their hubs. It is often the case that major network carriers o¤er nonstop service in markets in which it also operates one-stop service through a hub. Some examples of new entry of this type in 2000 include: the Boston to Myrtle Beach market where Delta o¤ered both a nonstop ‡ight and a one-stop ‡ight through Atlanta; the Las Vegas to Tulsa market where Delta o¤ered both nonstop service and one-stop service through Salt Lake City; and the Boston to Raleigh market where US Airways o¤ered a nonstop ‡ight and a one-stop ‡ight through Charlotte.
The issues raised in some informal complaints presented to the Department of Transportation (DOT) suggest that this paper may be of interest to policy makers. 4 Several low-cost carriers presented complaints to the DOT because major network carriers began o¤ering competing nonstop service in markets that are also served with one-stop service through a hub. A primary reason for these complaints was that it is relatively unusual for major network carriers to enter these types of markets. In 1995 ValuJet complained when US Airways began o¤ering competing nonstop service from Dulles to Boston and Dulles to Hartford. ValuJet argued that US Airways, in the prior 10 years, had not operated any service through Dulles that was not a major hub and that entry by US Air was anticompetitive. In 1996 Air South complained that Continental had attempted to overlay its new service in three markets: Charleston-Newark, Columbia-Newark, and Myrtle Beach-Newark. The DOT suggests that these types of strategic entry decisions are di¢ cult to explain as nonpredatory. This paper provides some insight into the types of markets that an airline may choose to o¤er both one-stop and nonstop ‡ights and why both these services may be o¤ered.
As theory would suggest I …nd evidence that both cannibalization and business stealing are important in shaping nonstop entry of airlines. I also …nd that the quality of the one-stop services in the market determines the size of the cannibalization and business stealing e¤ects. The amount of competition in a market increases with the number of nonstop rivals. However, a nonstop rival may have a second e¤ect on …rms that have an existing one-stop product in the market because nonstop entry reduces pro…ts on the existing one-stop ‡ights, which, in turn, reduces the cannibalization e¤ect. This suggests that nonstop rivals may have less of an impact on carriers with an existing one-stop service in the market relative to carriers without one-stop service. These …ndings suggest that in certain circumstances nonstop entry decisions by hub carriers that might appear to be predatory, may in fact be consistent with competitors attempting to match the quality of rivals. 5 The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses some of the related literature in airline entry, Section 3 examines the development and structure of airline networks, Section 4 explains the data and variables used in the analysis, Section 5 describes the econometric model, Section 6 discusses the estimates and predictions of the model, and the …nal section concludes. 4 The complaints to the DOT were discussed in chapter 2 of a report entitled Entry and Competition in the U.S. Airline Industry:
Issues and Opportunities (1999) (http://books.nap.edu/html/airline_dereg/pdf/) 5 This result is consitent with Mazzeo (2003) that shows that additional competition on a route typically leads to improved quality of service as measured by on-time performance.
There are many studies that look at entry in the airline industry, but few of them incorporate a structural model of competition. Since many studies have found that competition is an important determinant of entry in airline markets, a structural model of entry should do a better job of predicting the behavior of airlines than a more naive model. In this section I review some structural airline entry papers including Reiss and Spiller (1989), Berry (1992), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) . 6 Reiss and Spiller (1989) model the competition between di¤erentiated direct and indirect services. Note that direct service includes all nonstop ‡ights and also includes all ‡ights in which there is no change of planes. Indirect service means a passenger changes planes. They incorporate both entry and price competition in a structural model and examine how direct entry a¤ects price competition in the indirect and direct service market. They …nd that the indirect service category is signi…cantly more competitive if a direct competitor is also in the market.
They also …nd that within a route there can be large di¤erences in direct and indirect competition. This last point suggests that di¤erent service types should not be aggregated, adding support to the approach taken in this
paper. There are two key di¤erences between Reiss and Spiller's work and this paper. First, the Reiss and Spiller paper only examines markets with one or fewer direct entrants, while my paper considers markets in which there may be several airlines o¤ering nonstop ‡ights. Second, Reiss and Spiller (1989) assume carriers do not own both a direct and indirect ‡ight in the same market, while this paper is explicitly interested in service ownership.
Berry (1992) examines the role of market presence in both endpoint airports and its e¤ect on entry. He aggregates across service types when de…ning entry, and allows for multiple entrants. He assumes that entry a¤ects the pro…tability of all airlines symmetrically. This assumption implies that whether Southwest or American
Airlines enters a market they have the same e¤ect on the pro…tability of other airlines in the market such as Delta or Continental. However, Berry's model allows airlines to have both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in …xed costs. He …nds that the heterogeneity in airline presence at both endpoint airports is an important determinant of entry. Berry also …nds that his structural model of airline competition produces more realistic predictions of airline entry behavior than more simple entry models. 7 In my paper,
I assume that there is symmetry in nonstop competition, but allow for asymmetry in competition between the types of services o¤ered. That is, in this paper the de…ning characteristic of a carrier on a route is its network, not the brand of the carrier.
The current entry paper is also related to the entry model of Mazzeo (2002) . Mazzeo examines a game of product di¤erentiation and entry in motel markets. His model extends previous entry models by endogenizing product-type decisions (e.g. low-quality motel or high-quality motel). He then measures the e¤ects of competition between the di¤erent product types. My paper also allows for di¤erent product-types to a¤ect nonstop entry.
However, I treat one product type as …xed, the one-stop service, and I examine the entry decision of o¤ering nonstop service. One advantage of treating one-stop service as …xed is that I can examine continuous measures of product quality in the one-stop service a¤ecting nonstop entry, while Mazzeo's model captures discrete di¤erences in product quality. Justi…cation for treating one-stop service through a hub as …xed is given in the next section of the paper.
3 Hub-and-spoke System and Airline Networks
Before discussing the econometric model, it is important to have some understanding of the structure of airline networks. After deregulation of airlines in 1978, airlines quickly shifted to a hub-and-spoke system which remains the predominant structure in the industry today. 8 A hub-and-spoke system brings passengers from "spoke" cities into a "hub" city where passengers transfer planes and ‡y to destination "spoke" cities. There are both e¢ ciency and strategic advantages for operating hub-and-spoke networks.
The e¢ ciency of the hub-and-spoke system has been thoroughly studied both empirically and theoretically.
The hub-and-spoke system creates high density along spoke routes, which leads to lower costs per passenger. By channelling passengers into a hub, the network is able to generate greater density along all the spokes of the hub.
Therefore, hubs allow for more e¢ cient use of facilities and aircraft. Empirical studies by Caves et al (1984) and later Brueckner and Spiller (1994) estimate signi…cant cost savings from economies of density, which suggest that this is a key factor motivating the restructuring of the industry following deregulation. Brueckner et al (1992) examine the structure of the hub network directly and show that there is a relationship between higher tra¢ c density across the network and lower fares. Hendricks et al (1995) provide a formal theoretical model to explain economies of spoke density, and how hub-and-spoke networks arise from basic assumptions about cost savings from economies of density.
Other reasons airlines form hub-and-spoke networks involve strategic advantages. Hendricks et al (1997) explain why it is generally a dominant strategy for hub airlines not to exit a hub-spoke market. They argue that the hub-spoke market produces complementarities in ‡ights that connect in the hub. A monopoly hub that faces competition from a regional carrier along a spoke can credibly remain in the market under price competition because exiting a spoke causes losses in its complementary markets. This credible threat keeps potential entrants out of spoke markets. A hub carrier o¤ering frequent ‡yer miles also has a strategic advantage. Passengers that use frequent ‡yer miles value the hub carrier's frequent ‡yer miles more than other carriers because the hub serves a greater variety of destinations. 9 Hence, passengers that use frequent ‡yer plans may be more likely to choose the hub carrier. In the remainder of this paper I refer to the combined e¢ ciency and strategic e¤ects of airline networks as network e¤ects.
If the network e¤ects are su¢ ciently large, then after a hub-and-spoke network is formed, hub carriers will not …nd it pro…table exit spoke routes. Therefore, nonstop routes out of a hub are essentially …xed. A …xed hub network implies that one-stop routes made through the hub are also …xed because passengers can typically connect in a hub. An example using the …gure 1 from the introduction helps to illustrate this point. Suppose there are 17 cities and 16 spoke routes connected directly through hub city A. Assume that all connecting ‡ights through A are o¤ered. Now consider the marginal decision to o¤er nonstop service between two spoke cities B and C as shown by a dotted line in the above …gure. The decision to serve the market between B and C with nonstop service is exogenous to the decision to serve the market B to C through the hub if the entry decision in the A to C and A to B markets is una¤ected. Because A is a hub exiting a spoke market A to C or A to B implies exiting 15 connecting markets. The same factors that make it unlikely for a carrier to exit a spoke route of a hub also have implications for hub carriers entering spoke routes. The entry decision of a hub carrier will be less a¤ected by competitive factors on a particular route and will primarily be determined as a joint decision to serve the spoke market and many other markets through its hub.
To see that large hub-spoke networks are relatively …xed, I examine the entry and exit rates between all city pairs in a sample of the 50 largest cities. Table 1 There is clearly a trade-o¤ between selecting a city pair as the relevant market rather than an airport pair. An argument for using airport pair markets is that business travelers often have a strong preference for ‡ying out of major airports. This is the view taken in Ciliberto and Tamer I de…ne an airline as having a hub in a city if the features of the airline network in that city satisfy two selection rules. First, using DB1A data, I select cities in which a single carrier transports more than 300,000 passengers that make a single connection through the hub to one of the 188 selected cities mentioned above. The …rst rule eliminates all but 20 possible hubs. The second rule requires that 30 or more nonstop routes are o¤ered out of the hub. Applying the second rule leaves 18 selected hubs. These 18 hubs account for 81.4 percent of all one-stop tra¢ c. 1 2 To show that these selected hubs vary signi…cantly from other airport operations, I contrast characteristics of the selected hubs with the next 18 potential hubs with the highest number of stopping passengers. See table   8 for detailed list of the selected hubs and the next 18 potential hubs. Table 8 York market. The data shows nonstop service from Continental's hub in Houston to both Austin and New York.
Next, I examine whether this is the most direct one-stop ‡ight that Continental o¤ers. I …nd that although they have a hub in Cleveland, the one-stop ‡ight through Houston is a more direct route. Hence, I assume that the relevant service is the one-stop service being o¤ered is through Houston. 1 3 In de…ning one-stop service I exclude very low quality one-stop services o¤ered through hubs. I determine criteria for what one-stop service may be considered "low-quality" by looking at the directness of one-stop ‡ights that passengers usually ‡y as observed in the DB1A data. Typically, I did not observe one-stop passengers on routes in which the distance is more than twice the distance as the crow ‡ies between two cities. I do not consider an airline as o¤ering one-stop service if the distance along the two segments of the one-stop service is more than twice the distance between the city pairs.
In selecting the subsample of city pair markets, I begin by following Berry (1992) by choosing all city pair 1 2 I calculate this statistic as (total number of indirect passengers changing plans at the airport)/(tot passengers changing planes at the airport+total passengers originating from the airport+total passengers destined for the airport) 1 3 I checked this example on Expedia on March 3, 2005, and found that Continental o¤ered both nonstop and one-stop service between
Austin and New York where the one-stop service is o¤ered through Houston. In constructing the one-stop routes, I do not use information on where passengers are observed traveling. The problem with using the observed routes taken by passengers is that it is endogenous because it depends on the quality of the other services in the market and the pricing decision after entry.
combinations between the 50 most populated cities. The most populated cities are used because these are also cities that are more likely to have nonstop entry. An additional reason for using the 50 most populated cities is that the assumption of hub networks being …xed is more plausible in larger markets where the number of passengers in the network would diminish by a greater amount if the spoke route is exited. Recall that the descriptive statistics regarding entry and exit at hubs were based on the 50 largest cities. Next, I eliminate city pair markets based on two selection rules. First, markets in which any carrier operates a major hub are eliminated.
As argued before, because of the strong complementarities in hub markets, I treat nonstop entry out of hubs as …xed. Modeling this entry decision while treating it as …xed in other markets would be logically inconsistent.
The second type of market that is eliminated are city pair markets for which the distance between the cities is less than 300 miles. These markets are eliminated because I want to focus on markets where nonstop and one-stop services are likely to compete. In short distance routes the closest substitute to nonstop entry may be car travel
and not a one-stop ‡ight. After applying these selection rules I am left with 511 city pair markets.
Variables
The variables used in this paper include market variables and airline speci…c variables. The market variables include both population and distance variables. The population variable is constructed from the 1999 U.S.
Census Data measured as the geometric mean of the population in the two cities in millions. 1 4 The distance variable is the great circle distance between the two cities in hundreds of miles. I measure quality of the one-stop service as the total distance ‡own on the one-stop ‡ight minus the distance 1 4 In the A to B city pair market the population variable is P op = p (P opulationinCityA=1million) (P opulationinCityB=1million).
A similar measure is used by Berry (1992) 1 5 In the case where there are multiple airports in a city, I take the average distance between airports in the city.
as the crow ‡ies between two cities. For instance, the quality of the one-stop ‡ight in the Austin to Portland market with a stop in Houston may be calculated taking the following steps: calculate the distance from Austin to Houston, add the distance from Houston to Portland, and then subtract the distance crow ‡ying distance between Portland and Austin. I call this variable CircDist.
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A similar measure is used by Reiss and Spiller (1989) and Borenstein (1989) . 1 7 As this variable increases the quality of the one-stop service is lower. The variable
OwnCircDist is the CircDist variable of an airline's own one-stop service in the market. If an airline does not have a one-stop product in the market then OwnCircDist equals zero. The variable RivalCircDist is the quality of the highest quality rival airline in the market. If no airline is in the market then RivalCircDist equals zero.
The model in this paper estimates a game of competition between entrants. I consider an airline as a potential entrant in this model if the airline has some presence in both cities of the city pair market in the second quarter of 2000. 1 8 This de…nition may be justi…ed if one views nonstop entry as actually occurring in two stages: …rst airlines decide which cities they will enter, and second they decide which routes will be entered nonstop out of the city. The game analyzed in this paper takes the …rst stage of entry in a city as given and then analyzes the decision to enter nonstop in a particular city pair market. The reasons for using this de…nition of entry is that it focuses the entry game on the most likely set of entrants. This de…nition of a potential entrant di¤ers from that used in Berry (1992) which de…nes an airline as a potential entrant if they have some presence at either endpoint city. I …nd that the de…nition used by Berry includes many …rms as potential entrants that are not likely to enter a market.
Descriptive Statistics
Before describing the full empirical model, I examine some descriptive tables that provide some insights into the determinants of nonstop entry. Table 2 tabulates descriptive statistics by the number of airlines o¤ering nonstop service. The …rst column lists the number of nonstop entrants and the second column shows the frequency in which that number of nonstop entrants are observed in the data. The frequencies show that in most of the markets in the sample there is no airline o¤ering nonstop service. The third through sixth columns show the mean of the population variables, distance, number of one-stop services and the most direct one-stop service in the market. I …nd that distance is typically greater in markets in which no carrier o¤ers nonstop service. This may re ‡ect the success of low-cost carriers in entering short distance nonstop routes. The table also shows that nonstop services increase with population. In a markets with fewer nonstop services o¤ered the highest quality one-stop service is greater. 1 6 It should also be noted that CircDist relates to the cost of providing one-stop service. The greater the CircDist variable, the creater the cost of providing transportation services through a hub. 1 7 One could argue that a more accurate measure of quality may be total time of a ‡ight or some on-time performance measure at a hub. Although these measures may be a more accurate re ‡ection of consumer preferences, it is not clear that these measure of quality are exogenous to competition. Mazzeo (2003) …nds that the on-time performance of a carrier improves with increased competition in the market suggesting that on-time performance may be chosen by carriers. 1 8 By "presence" I mean that there is are some passengers observed ‡ying in or out of the city. Table 3 shows the number of markets entered by each airline and the average value of N etworkEf f ect for each airline. There are two points to note in this table. First, Southwest enters more markets than any other airline in the sample. This is not surprising given Southwest's strategy of avoiding direct competition with major hubs and their focus on entering markets with nonstop service. Second, there appears to be a strong association between the network e¤ect variable and the number of markets a carrier enters with nonstop service, suggesting that this is likely to be an important explanatory variable. For instance, Southwest that has entered the greatest number of markets in the sample, also has the highest average for the N etworkEf f ect variable. Table 4 shows some basic statistics of the CircDist quality measure including the mean, standard deviaion, minimum and maximum. These basic statistics provided in order of their quality ranking in the market, from highest quality (least circuitus) to lowest quality (most circuitus). Note that the average circular distance of the most direct one-stop ‡ight in the market is about 25 miles. This distance re ‡ects the strategic placement of hubs in central locations in the country, and centrally located hubs can o¤er more direct service to more destinations.
This suggests that for most cities there is a major hub that o¤ers fairly direct service. The average CircDist for the second highest quality …rm is more than three times greater than the highest quality. The average circular distance variable across all markets and all airlines is 2 (i.e. 200 additional miles are ‡own).
Econometric Model of Entry
I model airlines as playing a complete information entry game. At the beginning of the game, each potential entrant knows its own and its rivals' post-entry incremental pro…ts. Incremental pro…ts for o¤ering nonstop service depend on existing one-stop services in the market through a hub, network features in the city pair, observed and unobserved demand and cost factors, and the number of rivals entering with nonstop service. Given this information, airlines enter the market with nonstop service if their incremental pro…ts are positive, otherwise they do not. I will begin by describing an econometric entry model that is similar to the model presented in Berry (1992). 1 9 I assume the following functional form for the reduced-form incremental pro…t function for o¤ering nonstop service:
The variables x capture the in ‡uence of airline k's own one-stop service and the one-stop services of its rivals. I also allow for both market and …rm speci…c unobserved pro…ts i and ik . The parameters to be estimated are M arket ; N etwork ; OneStop and .
The variable Ni is the number of airlines that enter in the city pair market, which is the dependent variable in the above model. I assume that additional entry causes pro…t loss to other airlines in the market so 0.
The number of airlines that enter in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium equals the maximum number of airlines that can pro…tably enter a market. Formally, the equilibrium number of airlines that enter in market i is:
where Ki is the number of potential entrants in market i. The number of airlines that enter in equilibrium is unique. To see this, suppose it is not unique, then there is an equilibrium number of airlines Ni 6 = N i . If Ni > N i this implies that some airline must be making negative pro…ts, and if Ni < N i then there exists a airline that could pro…tably enter the market but chooses not to enter.
2 0
The identity of entering airlines in an equilibrium of the above game is not unique. Consider the simple example of a market with two potential entrants that each …nd it pro…table to enter as a monopolist, ik (1) > 0, but do not …nd it pro…table to enter in a duopoly market ik (2) < 0. The above model implies that
but it is unclear which of the two airlines enters. To use information on the identity of airlines I follow Berry (1992) by assuming that airlines enter in the order of post entry pro…tability. This assumption can be justi…ed by airlines playing a post-entry war of attrition that would instantly eliminate less pro…table airlines if more than N i enter as in Judd (1985) . Under the "most-pro…table …rm enters …rst" selection rule, let I ik be an indicator of entry by airline k in market i. The function I ik is 1 if …rm k in market i is one of the N i most pro…table airlines in the market, and 0 otherwise.
The above model does not allow for nonstop rivals to a¤ect one-stop pro…ts. It may be the case that a nonstop rival may reduce pro…ts on one-stop service, which may induce nonstop entry by a carrier o¤ering one-stop service.
The following is an alternative reduced-form pro…t function that allows nonstop competition to have a di¤erent e¤ect on hub carriers and nonhub carriers:
OneStop ik
The incremental pro…t function above di¤ers from the other model because it includes the parameter that accounts for the impact of a nonstop competitor on one-stop pro…ts for carriers o¤ering one-stop service. Theory would suggest that should be positive because additional competition in the nonstop market will erode pro…ts in the one-stop market, reducing cannibalization e¤ects, and making it hub carriers less responsive to the entry of nonstop rivals.
The inclusion of the additional coe¢ cient, , complicates the model because it introduces the possibility of multiple equilibria. The multiple equilibria may arise because the impact of rival entry on pro…tability di¤ers for one-stop and nonstop competitors. For instance, suppose that in the above equation the value of is greater than and both and are positive. Then for a market with two hub …rms there could be two equilibria, one where they both enter and another where neither enters. To address the potential problem of multiple equilibria, I select a unique equilibrium to estimate the above model. Speci…cally, I choose the Nash equilibrium with the greatest number of …rms entering the market, so the equilibrium selection rule remains identical to (2) above.
This selection rule is again consistent with the war of attrition game where the most pro…table …rms remain in the market. From these predictions errors I construct moments. Let f (Zi; Zi1; Zi2) be an L dimensional function of the market i exogenous data Zi and airline k exogenous data Z ik . Then given M markets and that vi(b) is uncorrelated with f (Zi; Zi1; Zi2) implies
The value g(b) is a vector of size L and the true b satis…es E[g(b)] = 0. The MSM-estimatorb is de…ned as the minimizer of weighted distance between observed and simulated moments, such that,b solves arg min
where the is a weight matrix. I estimate this model in two stages. In the …rst stage I set equal to the identity matrix to get a consistent estimate of b. In the second stage I calculate the optimal weight matrix = E (g(b) g 0 (b)) by using estimates of b from the …rst stage. Finally, I solve the above equation again using the new weight matrix to obtain my …nal estimates. I use simulated annealing to solve for the minimum of the objective function. 2 1 The approach of selecting a unique equilibrium to estimate a structural entry model is also applied in Mazzeo (2002) . 2 2 This section closely follows Berry (1992) . 
Estimates
Before estimating the full model, it may be useful to analyze a simpler probit model that excludes competition from the analysis. Although the probit model ignores competition between nonstop rivals, it provides a basic approach to look at the impact of one-stop services on nonstop entry. If competition with other nonstop entrants is not an important determinant of entry, then a simple probit model will accurately capture an airlines decision to enter a market. Table 5 shows two simple probit estimates of entry for all potential entrants in each market.
Model 1 only includes an airline's own one-stop service, while model 2 includes features of both an airline's own one-stop service and the service of its rivals. Focusing on model 2, the probit estimate shows that ownership of a one-stop service reduces the probability of entry. This re ‡ects cannibalization of an airline's own service. An increase in the circular distance of an airline's own one stop service increases the probability of entry. A reason for this is that cannibalization e¤ects are reduced as the quality of one's own service are lower. Recall that the CircDist variable captures the additional distance ‡own on a route and proxies for the time cost for the customer.
As an alternative, one could use the additional distance ‡own relative to the total direct distance by dividing the CircDist variable by the distance between the origin and destination cities and proxies for the relative time costs. I …nd that the results of the simple probit model estimated below do not qualitatively change if I use either quality measure. If there is a one-stop rival in the market then the probability of entry declines which is consistent with business stealing e¤ects. An increase in the circular distance of a rival airline's service increases the probability of entry suggesting that business stealing e¤ects are less for lower quality rival services. For each additional one-stop entrant the probability of entering increases. This last result is not consistent with the view that competition is greater as the number of one-stop entrants increases. Although the probit captures many of the e¤ects of interest, it is di¢ cult to know how important nonstop competition is between carriers until looking at estimates from the full model. Now I look at four speci…cations of the structural model that incorporates competition with other nonstop entrants. These estimates are shown in table 6. The …rst model is a benchmark model that excludes information on one-stop service in the market. The model is similar to that in Berry (1992) , but applied to nonstop entry.
In this benchmark model there are 19 moment conditions. 2 3 Most of the results of the benchmark model follow expectations. The larger the population in the cities the more likely airlines are to enter because of the greater demand in the market. The longer the distance the lower the demand and the higher the cost for o¤ering nonstop service. The greater the network e¤ect the more likely airlines are to enter. There are two results that are surprising in these estimates. First, the coe¢ cient on the number of rival nonstop entrants in the market is statistically insigni…cant. This is unexpected given that the structural studies by Berry (1992) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) that …nd competition has a statistical signi…cant e¤ect on the entry of other carriers. The second surprising result is that the market speci…c unobservable is insigni…cant. Since there are many market speci…c demand factors that are unobserved one might have expected this term to be positive and signi…cant. Examples of route speci…c unobservables include number of business travelers, vacation tra¢ c, or any other unobserved factor a¤ecting the amount of travel between two cities. It is possible that these market speci…c unobservable pro…ts are not present, but it may also be the case that we have not isolated the …rm speci…c heterogeneity.
The second speci…cation adds to the benchmark model by incorporating each airlines'own one-stop entry and the circular distance of the service. In estimating this model I include 8 additional moment restrictions to identify the additional parameters. 2 4 These estimates show that an airline having one-stop service of high quality reduces their pro…ts from o¤ering nonstop service. The estimates also show that as the circular distance of an airline's own one-stop service increases, incremental pro…ts from entering also increase. Both of these results are consistent with airlines reacting to cannibalization e¤ects. The result contrasts with the benchmark model because it shows that competition with other nonstop services has a signi…cant and negative e¤ect on pro…ts. These estimates imply that capturing the heterogeneity of airline service ownership in the market may be important for accurately capturing nonstop competition between airlines. In other words, it seems that the benchmark model may su¤er from omitted variable bias. The magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients imply that owning a high quality one stop product with an OwnCircDist ik variable near zero is similar in magnitude to having an additional nonstop rival in the market. This suggests that the magnitude of the cannibalization e¤ects are large in relative terms.
The last three estimates are full models that include both an airline's own one-stop service and the one- The results from full model 3 suggest that the e¤ect of an additional nonstop rival on the entry of a hub carrier will largely be determined by the quality of the hub carriers product. In particular, the results suggest that the higher quality …rms will be less likely to enter with nonstop service relative to low quality …rms that are more likely to react by matching the quality of rivals in the market. Since the average value of the OwnCircDist ik variable is 2, the results imply that nonstop entry will have little impact on carriers o¤ering an average quality one-stop service because the additional competition from a nonstop competitor is o¤set by an incentive to match quality.
For both the full model 2 and full model 3 results, the market speci…c error term is positive and statistically signi…cant, while it is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in other speci…cations. Finding that is positive and statistically signi…cant in these speci…cation suggests that this model may capture some important …rm-speci…c heterogeneity that helps isolate the market speci…c unobservable.
The models estimated above include a linear competitive e¤ect of (N ) rather than a term that assumes a decline in competition with additional entrants, such as log(N ). The linear functional form assumption was used because this paper is unlike traditional entry models because the model incorporates product ownership.
A priori, it wasn't clear how this might a¤ect the estimates, so a linear functional form was chosen. However, estimating full model 3 with the functional form log(N ), I …nd that the model is robust to this alternative speci…cation.
Predictions and Analysis
This section compares the predictions made by the models estimated in this paper. I compare the full models to the second probit model to evaluate the importance of structurally modeling competition. I also compare the full model 1 and full model 3 to the baseline structural model to check the importance of incorporating information on one-stop service. The results suggest that full model 3 provides the best prediction of the number of entrants, but that the probit produces the most accurate prediction on the identities of entering carriers. However, the full models appear to provide more reasonable out-of-sample predictions Table 7 shows the prediction for each of the four models. The …rst row of table 7 shows the estimated number of airlines predicted to enter, the next set of rows shows the measurements of the in-sample predictive accuracy of each model. The predictive accuracy of each model is measured using the mean squared error to predict the number of airlines that enter. The table shows that full model 3 performs the best, followed by the probit. The simple probit model seems to perform better than the other two models in predicting individual …rm entry. A potential reason for the predictive accuracy of the probit model is that in many markets it is unlikely that multiple nonstop carriers will compete, so the probit model is likely to perform. In addition, the "full model" only uses information on the two airlines with the greatest market presence, while the probit uses all individual airline entry decisions, so it is not surprising that the probit performs better for predicting individual entry. However, in-sample predictive accuracy is not the only criterion that should be used in determining the usefulness of a model. Reasonable out-of-sample predictions should also be considered. In table 7 I look at 5 di¤erent types of changes to exogenous variables and how these changes a¤ect the predicted number of entrants.
In In the …nal experiment I evaluate the total e¤ect of cannibalization from one-stop services by holding constant the rival services in the market and examine the e¤ect on entry if no …rm owned a one-stop service (i.e. assuming that the coe¢ cient on One Stop=0 and the coe¢ cient on OwnCircDist=0). With the full model I …nd evidence that when cannibalization e¤ects are removed the average number of nonstop services in the market increases to 417:2.
While the in-sample …t varies considerably across the models, the results from this section suggest that the probit estimates may be less reliable for making out-of-sample forecasts, and models that explicitly account for competition in the marketplace appear to produce more reasonable predictions.
Conclusion
Empirical studies of entry have largely ignored the role of product ownership in shaping new product entry decisions. This paper explicitly looks at the role of product ownership and its a¤ect on nonstop entry in the airline industry. The results from this paper con…rm many prior expectations. I …nd evidence that cannibalization of an airline's own one-stop service reduce the probability that an airline enters a market. As the quality of an airline's own one-stop service falls, this cannibalization e¤ect diminishes. Competition with rival one-stop services is also an important determinant of nonstop entry. The presence of a rival o¤ering one-stop service in the market reduces the probability of entry, which is consistent with competition between one-stop and nonstop service types.
In addition, I …nd that higher quality one-stop products reduce the probability of nonstop entry by a greater amount than lower quality one-stop products.
I …nd that competition between nonstop entrants is also an important determinant of nonstop entry. The results suggest that incremental pro…ts tend to decline as the number of nonstop rivals in the market increase. I also …nd that the e¤ect of an additional nonstop carrier in the market reduces the probability of nonstop entry by more for carriers not o¤ering one-stop service in the market relative to those that o¤er one-stop service. This is consistent with hub carriers pro…ts being impacted by multiple factors. Speci…cally, an additional nonstop competitor tends to reduce pro…ts for all airlines in the market, but there is also an incentive for the hub carrier to match quality of nonstop rivals as pro…ts on its one-stop service diminish with the entry of nonstop rivals. I …nd that the incentive to match quality is greatest for one-stop carriers o¤ering lower quality one-stop service.
More generally, the results in this paper provide some insight into what we might expect to …nd in other vertically di¤erentiated product markets with multiproduct …rms. The decision to enter a market with a highquality product depends on whether the …rm or one of its rivals already o¤ers low-quality service in the market.
Cannibalization e¤ects may shape the entry decision of …rms because owning a low quality product makes it less likely that a …rm will enter a market with a high-quality product. However, if a high-quality rival enters the market this reduces the cannibalization e¤ects from entry.
The results in this paper may also be useful for policymakers. The DOT mentioned several instances where low cost carriers have complained about major hub carriers entering markets with nonstop service, even though hub carriers o¤er one-stop service through a hub. The results from this paper suggest that this type of response is not unusual, especially in markets where the hub carrier's one-stop service is particularly low.
An important extension of this model may be to structurally identify marginal cost, …xed cost and demand factors a¤ecting entry decisions. These components of a …rms pro…t function may be identi…ed using additional information on prices and passenger travel. 
